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	 In the literature on responsibility and blame, ‘expectations’ and ‘demands’ are often used 
interchangeably. Specifically, R. Jay Wallace construes expectations and demands as equivalent 
ways of  expressing strict prohibitions or requirements. However, expectations and demands are 
not identical concepts and treating them as such glosses over important nuance. By using these 
concepts synonymously, Wallace is unable to account for how we blame and hold others 
responsible for actions that do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements, actions that are 
merely considered morally bad. In this paper I explore the distinction between expectations and 
demands and how ignoring this distinction ultimately produces an unduly revisionist account of  
responsibility and blame. By articulating the distinction between expectations and demands, I am 
able to put forth a wider conception of  accountability, one which better explains our 
responsibility practices, including why blame and resentment are fitting responses to morally bad 
actions.  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§1 INTRODUCTION 
	 We routinely hold people responsible in our everyday lives. But the conditions under 
which we can hold someone responsible and what we can hold her responsible for are 
controversial. In his seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” P. F. Strawson suggests that 
concerns regarding general metaphysical commitments are irrelevant to our responsibility 
practices, arguing instead that our ability to hold people responsible stems from the attitudes we 
naturally take towards a person and their actions.  Continuing in the Strawsonian tradition, R. 1
Jay Wallace puts forth an account of  moral responsibility which is essentially connected to the 
moral reactive attitudes. He argues that moral responsibility and its characteristic connection to 
moral blame and sanction are correctly situated within the nexus of  moral concepts of  
obligation, moral right, and moral wrong, such that the reactive attitudes and blame are only 
appropriate when an action violates a strict prohibition or requirement — when an action is 
morally wrong.  2
	 However in practice, we can and do appropriately hold people morally responsible for 
actions that fall outside of  this deontic realm; the moral reactive attitudes can be a fitting 
response to actions that are dis-commendable but are not violations of  strict prohibitions or 
requirements.  These cases of  blame and the reactive attitudes in response to morally bad actions 3
highlight how Wallace’s conception of  moral responsibility and the reactive attitudes does not 
accurately account for all of  our blaming behaviors. By suggesting that the moral reactive 
attitudes are only called for when strict prohibitions or requirements are violated, Wallace 
 P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Free Will and the Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F Strawson’s ‘Freedom 1
and Resentment,’ ed. Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (London: Routledge, 2016).
 R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1994), 51-52. 2
 I will use the term ‘morally bad’ to describe these actions which are dis-commendable but do not violate strict 3
prohibitions or requirements.   
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provides an unduly narrow and revisionist account of  responsibility, blame, and the reactive 
attitudes.  
	 I argue that the narrowness of  Wallace’s account is due to his conflation between 
expectations and demands. I argue that expectations and demands are separate concepts and by 
using them interchangeably Wallace obscures important nuance in our practices of  holding one 
another responsible. First, I provide an overview of  Wallace’s account of  the reactive attitudes 
and moral responsibility as accountability. §3 introduces two examples that I use to demonstrate 
the fittingness of  the reactive attitudes and blame in response to actions that are morally bad. 
These examples highlight a shortcoming of  Wallace's account of  responsibility — notably, its 
restriction to the deontic realm and thus its inability to account for blame as a fitting response to 
actions that are morally bad rather than morally wrong. Then in §4 I argue that expectations and 
demands are separate concepts. This includes whether expectations and demands are standards 
that constitute a relationship or standards that are based in a relationship, how often an instance 
of  an expectation or a demand needs to be fulfilled, the range of  excuses they are sensitive to, 
and when the reactive attitudes are a fitting response. §5 explains why violations of  expectations 
are the kind of  actions we can hold an agent responsible and therefore why the reactive attitudes 
can be a fitting response. And finally, §6 puts forth a unified account of  moral responsibility that 
explains how we hold people accountable for both actions that are morally wrong and morally 
bad.  
§ 2 WALLACE’S ACCOUNT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY  
§ 2.1 ATTRIBUTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
	 Wallace takes care to restrict his discussion of  moral responsibility to a sense of  
responsibility that is essentially connected to moral blame and sanction. Wallace distinguishes 
"2
between two notions of  responsibility, citing and attributing this distinction to an earlier, 
unpublished version of  Gary Watson’s paper “Two Faces of  Responsibility.” One sense of  
responsibility, what Wallace calls “conditions for autonomy,” is the sense in which an agent is 
responsible insofar as there is a causal connection between the agent and her action and the 
action is a reflection of  her evaluative commitments.  I will use Watson’s term attributability to 4
describe this sense of  responsibility, both for ease and the prevalence of  his terminology in the 
current responsibility literature. Because an agent’s actions reflect her values and commitments, 
she is subject to aretaic appraisals, an evaluation of  the sort of  person she is. 
	 Watson notes that aretaic appraisals and holding someone responsible in the 
attributability sense are concerned with an “agent’s excellences and faults — or virtues and vices” 
and can be “what we would call moral.” However this kind of  evaluation can be moral, it is not 
always moral: consider how we hold a mature artist to be responsible for her art because it 
reflects her values and commitments in a way that we would not hold a young child responsible 
for her finger paintings.  While there is a clear sense in which we can evaluate and hold the 5
mature artist responsible for the art she produces in a way that is not applicable to the child and 
her finger painting, this evaluation or sense of  responsibility is not exactly a moral evaluation or 
an instance of  holding someone morally responsible. Even if  you were to consider all instances of  
attributability responsibility or aretaic appraisals “to be moral in a broad sense, they are 
independent of  the particular moral norms” of  blame and sanction that are involved in and 
 Gary Watson, “Two Faces of  Responsibility,” in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 4
Press, 2004), 270.
 This example is originally attributable to Susan Wolf. See her book Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy 5
Press, 1993).
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provide the “special force” of  the particular kind of  moral responsibility that Wallace is 
concerned with.   6
	 The other sense of  responsibility, the one Wallace is interested in, has a characteristic 
connection to moral blame and sanction.  In restricting moral responsibility to the sense of  7
responsibility that is essentially connected to blame and sanction, Wallace exclusively conceives 
of  moral responsibility as what Watson coined as accountability; an agent is responsible for an 
action in the accountability sense if  and only if  she is liable to be sanctioned.  This characteristic 8
connection to blame and sanction puts moral responsibility in the deontic realm, in response to 
actions that are morally wrong. Wallace writes that his account  
connects the practice of  holding people morally responsible with the notions of  moral 
obligation, moral right, and moral wrong, which form the nexus of  concepts in which 
responsibility would seem to belong… the interpretation I offer suggests an appealing 
explanation of  how moral blame and the various sanctioning responses hang together as a 
class: to blame someone is to be subject to one of  the reactive emotions in terms of  which 
the stance of  holding people responsible is essentially defined, and these emotions are 
expressed by the sanctioning behavior to which the stance of  holding people responsible 
inclines us.  9
It is clear that Wallace conceives of  moral responsibility as accountability responsibility, where to 
be accountable is to be subject to blame or sanction. These sanctions are expressions of  the 
reactive attitudes,  which I will discuss in § 2.3, and include behavior like “avoidance, reproach, 10
scolding, denunciation, remonstration, and… punishment.”  Moving forward, unless otherwise 11
indicated, ‘responsibility’ should be understood in the accountability sense. 
 Watson, “Two Faces,” 266.6
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 54-55.7
 ibid. Watson even references Wallace as someone who has done specific work in accountability responsibility. See 8
“Two Faces,” 280.
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 51-52.9
 Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” in Free Will and the Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F 10
Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ ed. Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (London: Routledge, 2016), 169.
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 54.11
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§ 2.2 RESPONSIBILITY, OBLIGATION, EXPECTATIONS, AND DEMANDS 
	 Wallace conceives of  moral responsibility in terms of  obligation, moral right, and moral 
wrong. For Wallace, an obligation is an expectation or a demand that admits moral content or 
justification.  Wallace uses obligations, expectations, and demands interchangeably since he 12
conceives of  expectations and demands as equivalent ways of  expressing practical requirements 
or prohibitions in a given situation. These expectations and demands, according to Wallace, 
should be conceived of  as strict prohibitions or requirements.  Because expectations and 13
demands are construed as strict prohibitions or requirements, expectations and demands outline 
the actions that are morally forbidden and required, actions that we deem morally right and 
wrong. This firmly places Wallace’s account of  responsibility in the deontic realm considering 
that any action that violates a obligation or strict prohibition or requirement will be one that is 
considered morally wrong. 
	 Wallace’s account of  responsibility is such that to hold someone responsible is to hold her 
accountable. In holding someone accountable, you are holding her to an expectation or a 
demand and holding someone to an expectation or a demand is essentially to adopt what Wallace 
calls the quasi-evaluative stance. This stance is such that if  you believe an expectation or a 
demand is not met, you are susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or deem them an 
appropriate response.  While Wallace uses the word ‘appropriate’ to describe the reactive 14
attitudes as a response to a violation of  obligation, ‘fitting’ may be a more appropriate term. 
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson distinguish ‘appropriate’ from ‘fitting’ by way of  the 
inclusion of  practical or pragmatic considerations when evaluating a response as appropriate. 
 Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 165.12
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 22.13
 Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 159.14
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Although it may be fitting for a graduate student to feel immense amount of  anxiety while taking 
the Graduate Records Exam insofar as it is an intelligible response, it may not be an appropriate 
response especially if  it is negatively influencing her performance on the exam.  In some of  15
Wallace’s other work he indicates that he intends the reactive attitudes as an appropriate response 
to be understood as being “ ‘called for’ in the sense of  being intelligible and fitting reactions.”  16
For this reason, it seems to me that ‘fitting’ is more felicitous and moving forward, I will use it 
instead of  ‘appropriate’ to discuss the reactive attitudes unless directly quoting Wallace.  
	 It is this fittingness of  the reactive attitudes and our susceptibility to experience them that 
is constitutive of  truly holding someone to an expectation. When you are holding someone to an 
expectation, you are adopting this disjunctive, quasi-evaluative stance and either are susceptible 
to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them fitting if  you believe the expectation has not 
been met. Alternatively, if  an agent violates an expectation or a demand and you do not 
experience the reactive attitudes or deem them a fitting response, you are in fact not holding her 
to that expectation or demand and are not actually holding her responsible.  17
§ 2.3 THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 
	 By giving the reactive attitudes a central role in responsibility, Wallace follows in the 
Strawsonian tradition. However unlike Strawson, Wallace sees the need to clarify the reactive 
attitudes’ essential characteristics before relying on them so heavily.  Strawson conceived of  the 18
reactive attitudes as coextensive with any emotions that are central to our interpersonal 
relationships such as love, forgiveness, guilt, resentment, etc. Wallace restricts the reactive 
 Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of  Emotions,” Philosophy 15
and Phenomenological Research 61, no. 1 (July 2000): 65-90.
 R. Jay Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of  T. M. Scanlon, ed. 16
R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 355.
 Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 160.17
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 26.18
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attitudes to a smaller scope than Strawson propounded by defining reactive attitudes through 
their essential connection to an expectation or a demand.  What it is to be a reactive attitude is 19
to be a sentiment that is necessarily tied to the violation of  an expectation or a demand. This 
connection to strict prohibitions or requirements differentiates the reactive attitudes from other 
non-reactive moral sentiments, such as shame and gratitude. Whereas the moral reactive 
attitudes are involved with the concepts of  moral right and wrong, the moral sentiments are 
involved with the “modalities of  moral value.” These modalities of  moral value are concepts that 
are estimable or disestimable, including courage, beneficence, and perhaps rudeness.   20
	 Wallace also notes that there can be both moral and nonmoral reactive attitudes. When 
an obligation — an expectation or demand that admits moral content — is violated, the reactive 
attitudes will also contain moral content and be classified as a moral reactive attitude. These 
include the paradigmatic moral reactive attitudes of  guilt, indignation, and resentment.  21
	 The essential connection between the reactive attitudes and expectations or demands is 
able to explain why the reactive attitudes are propositional attitudes as well as why they are 
backwards-looking.  Consider the paradigmatic moral cases of  resentment, guilt, and indignation: 
we feel guilty about something or resent someone for something. The connection to an expectation 
or a demand provides the propositional content for the reactive attitudes. This propositional 
content explains the attitudinal component of  the reactive attitudes. The connection to an 
expectation or a demand also explains the “backward-looking” nature of  the reactive attitudes.  22
 Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 163. 19
 ibid., 161.20
 For brevity, throughout the rest of  the paper I will drop the ‘moral’ from ‘moral reactive attitudes,’ even though I 21
intend them to be understood as moral reactive attitudes..
 ibid., 163, 173. The backwards-looking nature of  blame is focused on an action that is performed by an agent in 22
the past and the fittingness of  the response to the particular action, whereas the forward-looking nature is concerned 
with ensuring the action is not performed again. 
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It is because the reactive attitudes are directed towards an action in the past, an action that was 
performed by an agent and violated an expectation or demand, that they are considered 
backward-looking. The fact that the reactive attitudes are in response to a specific violation of  an 
expectation or demand is what makes the attitude “reactive.” Both the reactive and attitudinal 
components of  the reactive attitudes are attributed to their essential connection to expectations 
or demands. 
	 Further, because Wallace understands responsibility, accountability, the reactive attitudes, 
blame, and sanction to hang together in a class, the reactive attitudes’ connection to expectations 
and demands also explains the backward looking nature of  blame. For Wallace, blame and 
blameworthiness are necessarily understood in terms of  the reactive attitudes and therefore are 
understood by their connection to expectations and demands. To judge someone blameworthy is 
to deem the reactive attitudes a fitting response, whereas blame requires actually experiencing the 
reactive attitudes.  Therefore, when you hold someone to an expectation or demand and adopt 23
the quasi-evaluative stance, experiencing the reactive attitudes is constitutive of  blaming her, 
whereas deeming them fitting is to judge her to be blameworthy.  Because the reactive attitudes 24
are necessarily involved in our blaming responses, just as our reactive attitudes are backward-
looking, so too is our blame. 
	 Before moving onto the next section, I will briefly summarize Wallace’s account. First, to 
hold someone responsible is to hold her accountable in the sense that she is liable to be blamed or 
sanctioned. To hold someone accountable is just to hold her to an expectation or a demand, 
where expectations and demands are equivalent ways of  expressing strict requirements or 
prohibitions. When holding someone to an expectation or a demand, if  you believe the agent has 
 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 77.23
 This judgement of  blameworthiness is sufficient for holding someone morally responsible. 24
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violated said expectation or demand, you are disposed to experience the reactive attitudes such as 
resentment, guilt, and indignation, or to deem them a fitting response. This is the quasi-
evaluative stance. If  you deem the reactive attitudes a fitting response you are judging the agent 
to be blameworthy, whereas experiencing the reactive attitudes are necessary for blaming the 
agent.  
§ 3 TWO EXAMPLES  
	 Overall, Wallace’s account of  responsibility provides explanations for certain aspects of  
responsibility that had previously been unexamined — how responsibility is connected to blame 
and sanction and what makes an emotion a reactive attitude. Because Wallace draws an essential 
connection between the reactive attitudes and strict prohibitions or requirements, he limits the 
reactive attitudes and blame as fitting responses only when an action is morally wrong. However, 
if  we examine our actual experiences and responsibility practices, blame and the reactive 
attitudes can be fitting responses to actions that are not morally wrong, but are instead classified as 
morally bad. While morally wrong actions are appropriately connected to strict prohibitions and 
requirements, morally bad actions do not have this connection. Morally bad actions are actions 
that should not have been done even though they do not violate strict prohibitions or 
requirements. Nonetheless, morally bad actions are ones which we can still be held accountable 
for.  
	 In this section I will use two examples, one from Coleen Macnamara and one from David 
Shoemaker, to illustrate cases where the reactive attitudes and blame are fitting responses to 
actions that do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements. I argue that this result is something 
which Wallace’s conception of  responsibility is unable to accommodate and that our 
"9
understanding of  responsibility in actuality is not nor should not be restricted to the deontic 
realm of  morally wrong actions. 
	 This is not to say that responsibility and blame are appropriate outside of  the deontic 
realm merely in some sense. Some philosophers, such as Watson and T. M. Scanlon have 
suggested that the evaluative realm is primarily concerned with responsibility as attributability. 
For Watson, aretaic concerns fall within the attributability face of  responsibility and yet actions 
that open agents up to these aretaic evaluations can still be blamed. However, blame in the 
attributability sense, according to Watson, collapses into merely a judgement of  blameworthiness 
and is separate from the moral norms that are involved in responsibility as accountability.  T. M. 25
Scanlon argues that responsibility should be appropriately conceived of  as attributability. On his 
account, to blame someone is to take your relationship with them to be impaired in some way 
and to adjust the intentions and expectations you have of  the other person.  This seems to be a 26
very weak conception of  blame and is certainly a much weaker conception than the one I am 
concerned with. I argue that blame and accountability, to which the reactive attitudes are central, 
can be fitting responses to morally bad actions. The reactive attitudes, blame, and responsibility 
are not features only of  the deontic realm but also can be fitting in the evaluative realm. 
	 In her paper “Taking the Demands out of  Blame,” Coleen Macnamara argues that 
blame’s putative connection to demands excessively restricts when the reactive attitudes are 
appropriate and therefore fails to capture all of  our blaming practices. To illustrate this, she 
provides the following counterexample:  
You are a graduate student and you have a paper due in exactly twenty hours. Your plan is 
to stay seated at your desk typing away until the paper is finished. It just so happens that 
you have three library books due today, and though it would not be the end of  the world if  
 Watson, “Two Faces of  Responsibility,” 278.25
 T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).26
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you failed to return them on time, your roommate, another graduate student, is headed to 
campus. You ask her if  she will return your books for you. She says no. She refuses, not 
because she won’t be near the library and her day is jam-packed, but simply because she 
doesn’t feel like it. You react with resentment.  27
Your roommate is not required, let alone strictly required, to return your books for you. Your 
library books are your responsibility and to strictly require your roommate to take on your 
responsibilities is absurd. On Wallace’s account, resentment cannot be a fitting response because 
your roommate did not violate a requirement and therefore her action cannot be considered 
morally wrong. Nonetheless, your resentment certainly seems fitting — your roommate did not 
have any reason to deny your very reasonable request. 
	 To respond to this example, Wallace can either deny that you are feeling resentment, 
suggesting instead that you are experiencing some other moral sentiment that does not fall into 
the category of  the reactive attitudes, or he could insist that you roommate did in fact violate a 
demand. Wallace could argue that your roommate violated a general demand, perhaps the 
demand that considering you are a rational agent, your ends need to be taken seriously, rather 
than the demand that your roommate return your books for you. Although this response may be 
successful in addressing the library example, it is less successful in response to other examples. 
Consider a scenario presented by David Shoemaker: 
     Anniversary: George and Martha have been married for several years. Each year as their 
anniversary approaches, Martha drops subtle but increasingly forceful hints about the sort 
of  gift she would greatly appreciate for their anniversary. These should merely be hints, 
she thinks, because were she to have to tell George explicitly what she wants and where to 
get it, his gesture would be less a gift than an errand. Unfortunately, each year George 
misses the hint and buys her some carnations, her least favorite flower. After the tenth year 
this happens, Martha gives up, deeply disappointed in George. The next year she accepts 
the carnations with as much feigned enthusiasm as she can muster, but she is no longer 
disposed to be as chipper about their anniversary or certain ceremonial aspects of  it, nor is 
 Coleen Macnamara, “Taking the Demands out of  Blame,” in Blame Its Natures and Norms, ed. D. Justin Coates and 27
Neal A. Tognazzini, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145. This example will be referred to as the library 
example.
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she disposed to pay as much attention to George’s hints about what he would like for 
various holidays.  28
Shoemaker writes that Martha’s response involves mere disappointment, and her blame “involves 
no resentment and seeks no sanctions;” George has only dashed Martha’s hopes and has done 
nothing that would make resentment fitting.  But this does not seem quite right. Martha’s 29
response of  mere disappointment, dashed hopes, and a disposition to give up on the possibility of  
George attending to her preferences is a very mild and unrealistic response to her husband 
consistently ignoring her subtle hints and communications for ten years.  In fact, the stronger 30
emotional response of  resentment seems to be fitting even though George’s actions do not violate 
a strict prohibition or requirement. 
	 While I agree with Shoemaker that blame would be a fitting response from Martha in the 
anniversary case, if  her response merely includes attributing a moral fault to George and 
adjusting the expectations she has of  him as the example is currently written, this response 
cannot appropriately be considered blame. This weak response leaves out a quality of  
opprobrium that is tightly connected to the reactive attitudes and gives blame its special force.  31
To label Martha’s response in Shoemaker’s anniversary example as blame would be a misnomer.  
 David Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability: Toward a Wider Theory of  Moral 28
Responsibility,” Ethics 121 (April 2011), 620-621. While Shoemaker is not addressing Wallace’s account of  
responsibility in his paper, his examples will be relevant to my purposes here.
 ibid., 622. Shoemaker acknowledges the familiar sentiment that the reactive attitudes and sanctions have an 29
essential connection to accountability. However, if  in his anniversary case he portrayed resentment and sanction as 
an appropriate response from Martha, it would undermine his goal of  using this example to pull apart answerability 
from accountability. See page 617.
 As described, it also seems incorrect for Shoemaker to construe Martha’s changes in behavior and attitude as non-30
sanctioning. 
 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 368. Wallace lobs this criticism against T. M. Scanlon, saying his account 31
leaves the blame out of  blame. Shoemaker makes use of  Scanlon’s account of  blame when discussing agents who are 
answerable yet not accountable. Although Shoemaker does point out that Scanlon’s account fails to note the 
important role that accountability blame and the reactive attitudes play in responsibility, he still considers Scanlonian 
blame to fall under the “general rubric of  blame.” Nonetheless, I think Wallace would object to both Scanlon and 
Shoemaker’s use of  the term ‘blame’ outside of  the realm of  accountability and the reactive attitudes. 
"12
	 Consider a modified anniversary example, one in which things unfold as Shoemaker 
imagines, but where Martha responds more realistically by experiencing resentment and actually 
blaming George. In this case, even though George did not violate a strict requirement, Martha’s 
resentment and blame seem to be fitting.  Wallace’s account of  responsibility is unable to explain 32
the fittingness of  resentment and blame in this modified anniversary example; unlike the library 
example, there is not an obvious candidate for a strict requirement which George violates that 
could be substituted in and would therefore account for the fittingness of  Martha’s blaming 
response. 
	 Rather than stretching to find a general requirement that would account for the reactive 
attitudes as an appropriate response to morally bad actions, I suggest acknowledging a distinction 
between expectations and demands, one in which both concepts cannot appropriately be 
construed as strict prohibitions and requirements. While many philosophers in the moral 
responsibility literature use expectations and demands interchangeably, some philosophers have 
alluded to such a distinction. Michael McKenna writes “expectations in particular connote 
something more open-ended, since we can expect things of  others that we do not require of  
them.”  The distinction I argue for creates more than mere conceptual space between the two 33
concepts, explores why expectations are more open-ended than demands, and compared to 
Wallace’s theory of  responsibility, better accounts for all of  our blaming practices, including the 
reactive attitudes as a fitting response to morally bad actions. 
 Moving forward, references to the anniversary case will be references to this modified version unless otherwise 32
specified. 
 Michael McKenna, Conversations and Responsibility, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 180. In the rest of  33
the chapter McKenna uses his conversational model to put forth a unified account of  moral responsibility. Although 
I also see myself  as providing a unified account, I further explore why expectations are more open-ended than 
demands and why violations of  expectations are morally bad or suberagatory actions.
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§ 4 EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS  
	 Before discussing the distinction between expectations and demands, I want to clarify that 
although there are multiple notions of  expectations, I, like Wallace, am focused on normative 
expectations. Whereas descriptive expectations outline actions that are believed to have a high 
probability to occur, normative expectations outline actions that should occur, even if  empirical 
data indicates otherwise.  Consider an example from Susan Greenspan: 34
If  someone is known to be unusually lazy, say, or simply to dislike a certain kind of  action 
— cleaning up, for instance — it might not be reason for us to ‘expect’ that person to 
perform it, in the sense of  predicting that he will; but it might still be reasonable to think 
that the person ought to perform it — to expect it of  him, in the sense of  holding him to a 
standard which requires it.  35
Some philosophers have acknowledged that the concept of  a demand cannot appropriately 
account for all of  our responsibility practices. Jonathan Bennett writes “I doubt if  ‘demand’ really 
covers all the ground” for explaining all of  the reactive attitudes.  Watson only uses ‘demands’ 36
when discussing the accountability face of  responsibility and never in the discussion of  the 
attributability face, so it is possible that Watson is be sympathetic to such a distinction as well. 
George Sher points out that such a distinction might also be unstated but central to Scanlon’s 
account of  blame:  
Scanlon appears to understand the moral relationship as involving two distinct sets of  
intentions and dispositions, the members of  one of  which are conditional upon others 
having corresponding intentions and dispositions while the members of  the other are 
not.  37
 Wallace takes the distinguishing feature of  normative expectations to be their essential connection to attitudinal 34
responses. See “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 159.
 Susan Greenspan, “Unfreedom and Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral 35
Psychology, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72. This may explain the 
seeming paradoxical nature of  a statement where someone expresses that they (normatively) expect someone to do 
something while simultaneously (descriptively) expect someone not to do that very thing.
 Jonathan Bennett, “Accountability,” in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, ed. Zak van Straaten 36
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 42.
 George Sher, “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of  the Stranger,” in Blame: Its Natures and Norms, ed. 37
by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53.
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I mentioned earlier that McKenna also makes a distinction between demands and expectations. 
But if  Wallace introduced the concept of  expectation to the quasi-evaluative stance to 
accommodate for demands’ insufficient explanatory power regarding responsibility and the 
reactive attitudes, by effectively equating it with the concept of  demands he would have 
undermined the initial reason for introduction. 
	 Regardless of  his motivations for incorporating expectations into the quasi-evaluative 
stance, the way Wallace uses expectations and demands synonymously to express practical 
prohibitions or requirements glosses over nuance in our responsibility and blaming practices. 
Expectations and demands are not identical concepts but differ in the kinds of  standards they 
constitute, how frequently instances of  expectations or demands need to be met, and the range of  
excuses to which they are sensitive. This section draws a distinction between expectations and 
demands and shows that violations of  demands are actions we consider to be morally wrong, 
whereas violations of  expectations are actions which are morally bad. After explaining these 
differences, I discuss how expectations can call for the reactive attitudes as a fitting response and 
what role expectations play in responsibility. The account I argue for widens Wallace’s account so 
that it fits more accurately with our phenomenological experience of  the reactive attitudes and 
provides a unified account of  responsibility and blame for both morally wrong and morally bad 
actions. 
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§ 4.1 RELATIONSHIP-CONSTITUTING AND RELATIONSHIP-BASED STANDARDS	 
	 It is easiest to consider blame and responsibility in the context of  our close interpersonal 
relationships with friends, coworkers, significant others, and so forth.  Different kinds of  38
relationships have different standards that define what it is to stand in that kind of  relationship 
and what it would be for that particular relationship to be considered good or flourishing. The 
standards that define the mere existence of  the relationship are the relationship-constituting 
standards, where those that outline the flourishing of  the relationship are relationship-based 
standards.  39
	 Shoemaker explains relationship-constituting standards as “standards defined in terms of  
the claims the parties have on one another.”  These are the minimal claims that make a 40
particular kind of  relationship possible and outline what actions are considered necessary and 
impermissible in that relationship. Alternatively, standards that are relationship-based outline the 
range of  potential for the relationship and give rise to the notion of  what a flourishing or thriving 
relationship of  that type looks like.  While Shoemaker argues that relationship-based standards 41
express the hopes an individual has for the relationship, I argue that relationship-based standards 
are expectations that can make claims on another person. The claims that expectations make are 
similar to those made by demands, however they are not the minimal requirements for the 
existence of  the relationship. This claim-making ability of  expectations is what ultimately will 
 This is not to say that we can only hold people responsible if  we have a close interpersonal relationship with them. 38
We clearly hold strangers and others responsible even if  it seems that we do not have a particular relationship with 
them. However, considering that we spend much of  our time around those with whom we have close interpersonal 
relationships, examples of  blame and responsibility in this context will be readily available and illuminating. 
  Wallace uses “relationship-constituting” and “relationship-based” in reference to norms in his paper 39
“Dispassionate Opprobrium.” Shoemaker makes use of  a similar distinction in “Attributability, Accountability, and 
Answerability” using the terms “relationship-defining” and “relationship-potential” to discuss standards and 
impairments. For consistency, in this paper I will stick to the ‘relationship-constituting’ and ‘relationship-based’ 
terminology. 
 Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability,” 621.40
 ibid.41
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allow us to hold one another accountable when an expectation is not met. If  relationship-based 
standards were mere hopes, as Shoemaker suggests, resentment or indignation would not be an 
appropriate response when hopes are dashed.  42
	 First, consider relationship-constituting standards as the demands to which the parties 
hold each other. These are the minimal requirements that constitute the mere existence of  a 
relationship and therefore prescribe behaviors that are impermissible or required in order to be in 
that kind of  relationship. Wallace writes that moral requirements “help to realize valuable forms 
of  interpersonal relation: they are relationship-constituting.” Actions that violate these demands 
are ones that are morally wrong and will elicit the reactive attitudes and blame as a fitting 
response.  On this, Wallace and I agree. As such, demands are appropriately construed as strict 43
prohibitions and requirements. Since our conception of  right and wrong is binary, the clear-cut 
and compulsory nature of  demands mirrors and explains why we consider actions that violate 
demands to be morally wrong. The modality of  demands and the actions they prescribe parallels 
the modality of  our assessment of  them.   
	 To explore demands as relationship-constituting standards, consider another scenario put 
forth by Shoemaker: 
 Adrienne Martin puts forth an account of  normative hope in which reactive attitudes, such as gratitude or pride, 42
can be an appropriate response. She sees herself  as making a parallel move to Wallace, where normatively hoping 
something of  someone else is another way to relate to them interpersonally, just has holding others responsible is a 
way to relate to them interpersonally.  See chapter 5 “Normative Hope” in her book How We Hope: A Moral Psychology 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014). While I am interested in and sympathetic to what she is trying to 
accomplish, I find issues with her account and reliance on Wallace’s account of  responsibility because she does not 
head Wallace’s instruction to conceive of  normative expectations as strict prohibitions or requirements, which is 
something that he emphasizes heavily. Additionally, from my precursory thoughts on normative expectations and 
normative hope, it seems to me that expectations will differ from hope in ways of  sensitivity to evidence or 
descriptive expectations, whether or not it would be reasonable to take measures against someone or to create a 
contingency plan in each case, and ultimately and most importantly for the purpose of  this paper, whether or not 
you can hold someone to an expectation or a hope in the sense of  holding her accountable.
 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 365, 368. I depart from Wallace’s account by arguing that expectations 43
should not be construed as strict prohibitions and requirements, and that morally bad actions, ones which violate 
expectations as relationship-based standards, also can appropriately call for the reactive attitudes, blame, and moral 
responsibility as accountability.
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Cheating: George and Martha have been married for several years. One evening, while 
George is taking a shower, Martha answers his cell phone, but the caller immediately 
hangs up. She notices that George has received many calls from this particular number 
recently, and she then discovers a texting thread from his number, along with texting 
threads from many other numbers. The texts leave no doubt that George has been having 
multiple affairs. When confronted with this evidence, George initially denies it but then 
gives in and admits it. Martha is furious, and she reaches for the closest object she can find 
to swing at George. It is a golf  club, which he successfully dodges. He runs for the car.  44
In this example, fidelity is a demand that is constitutive of  George and Martha’s marriage, one 
that defines their monogamous relationship. By having multiple affairs, George has failed to meet 
this demand: his actions violated a strict prohibition and in turn, his actions are morally wrong. 
	 The binary nature of  demands can be contrasted with the more flexible and nebulous 
nature of  expectations. Expectations set the relationship-based standards and outline the 
potential flourishing or the quality of  the relationship. Michelle Mason, when arguing against  
what she calls the deontic imperative view of  the reactive attitudes, which includes Wallace’s, 
writes that “normative expectations derive from an ideal of  the special relationship; hence just 
which normative expectations are operative depends on the relationship in question.”  In any 45
particular relationship, there are actions that would be better or worse to perform, ones that 
would impact or reflect the quality of  the relationship. Because expectations pick out actions that 
fall along a gradient, they cannot be construed as strict prohibitions or requirements. These 
actions will also be ones that we assess as good or bad, better or worse, rather than right or 
wrong. Again, the modality of  expectations and the actions they prescribe parallels the modality 
of  our assessment. 
	 In the anniversary example, it would be silly to say that George picking up on Martha’s 
hints is a requirement that is constitutive of  their marriage. Instead, this expectation is a 
 Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability,” 621.44
 Mason, Michelle., “Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address,” in Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, ed. 45
by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber, 153-170. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 166.
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reflection of  what a good or flourishing marriage looks like. When George fails to pick up on 
Martha’s hints, even though he does not undermine the marriage as a whole, he does undermine 
the idea that their marriage is flourishing. In a way, by meeting expectations and performing 
actions that an agent is not strictly required to do, she expresses a commitment to valuing the 
relationship or to the relationship thriving.  
	 Similar to the anniversary case, your roommate is not required to return your books for 
you, even if  it is something that you expect of  her. Although returning each others’ books is not a 
requirement that is constitutive of  being roommates, it is a reasonable expectation that would 
indicate that the roommate relationship is flourishing, especially if  such a small favor is of  little 
consequence to your roommate. By not returning your books or picking up on Martha’s hints, 
your roommate and George are not doing anything wrong since they are not violating something 
that they are strictly required to do. However, by not meeting their respective expectations, your 
roommate and George are doing something that would have been better to not have done and to 
have meet the expectation, instead.  
	 Relationship-based standards only seriously come into play once the relationship-
constituting standards are met. In order to hold someone to an expectation, they first must meet 
the demands that constitute the relationship itself; in order for a relationship to flourish, it 
necessarily must first exist.   46
§ 4.2 FREQUENCY OF FULFILLMENT 
	 There is a connection between whether a standard is relationship-constituting or 
relationship-based and the frequency at which they need to be met. This provides an additional, 
 This ‘first’ should not be construed temporally, necessarily, although I do think it is often the case that individuals 46
meet the demands of  the relationship before meeting the expectations based in the relationship. This ‘first’ should be 
understood in a general sense of  priority.
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although related distinction. Because demands outline the behaviors that are constitutive of  the 
relationship, they identify actions that are required to stand in a particular relationship to one 
another. Necessarily, the actions prescribed by demands also need to be met at every opportunity 
in order for the demand to be met overall. George is strictly prohibited from cheating on Martha 
because it is a standard that is constitutive of  the relationship that they stand in. This is not a 
requirement that occasionally needs to be met, but rather one that needs to meet in every 
instance. Even if  George cheats on Martha only once, he has failed to meet this demand.  
	 Now, this does not mean that a single violation of  a relationship-constituting demand is 
sufficient to annihilate the existence of  the relationship. Wallace notes that relationship-
constituting norms are “complex, and a single episode of  disloyalty would generally not be 
sufficient to transform a [relation]ship into a non[relation]ship.”  This is simply to say that an 47
action that violates a strict prohibition is sufficient for the demand to be violated overall. Even if  
George was unfaithful only once, regardless of  the circumstances, George would fail to meet 
Martha’s demands. While this example uses a standing demand, it is certainly possible that a 
demand may only need to be fulfilled once, given there was only one opportunity to meet such a 
demand. The important feature of  a demand is that it needs to be met whenever an opportunity 
presents itself. 
	 On the other hand, sometimes expectations can be met overall even if  the actions they 
prescribe are not performed at every opportunity. In order for a relationship to be considered 
flourishing, the actions might only need to be performed at a frequency that meets a certain 
threshold. While George is expected to pick up on Martha’s hints, it is not something that he 
must always do in every instance. If  George picked up on her hints with perfect consistency, he 
 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 359. Wallace was talking about friendships specifically in this case.47
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might be seen as going above and beyond or surpassing Martha’s expectations for the 
relationship. 
	 In such a case, the expectation might have a temporally extended condition of  fulfillment, 
such that one can only accurately assess whether an expectation is met overall after a sufficient 
amount of  time has elapsed. For example, Martha might not consider her expectations to be 
unfulfilled the first couple of  times George fails to pick up on her hints. If  George only missed 
these hints early on in the relationship or only missed two out of  the ten years, this would be 
insufficient for Martha to assess that her expectations had not been met. The repetitive nature of  
his actions, the fact that George more often than not fails to pick up on her hints, is what 
constitutes his failure to meet her expectations. 
	 Contrast this with demands, which can not have this temporally extended condition of  
fulfillment. Because demands need to be met in every instance, there is not a threshold of  
relevant data an individual needs to collect in order to appropriately assess whether the demand 
has been met or not. Even in a standing demand, such as Martha’s demand for fidelity in the 
cheating case, if  there is a single instance of  violation, if  George cheated on her even once, the 
demand overall has been violated. The fact that Martha’s demand is continuous does not change 
the nature of  the demand fulfillment or the frequency at which each instance must be fulfilled.  
§ 4.3 EXCUSE SENSITIVITY 
	 Expectations and demands also differ in the range of  excuses they are sensitive to. There 
is a wide range of  various excuses that an agent could provide to explain why she failed to meet 
an expectation. Your roommate could be running late for a meeting or feeling ill, or perhaps she 
intended to return your books for you and forgot them on her way out the door. If  George failed 
to pick up on Martha’s hints only early on in the relationship or sparingly, perhaps George’s 
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uncertainty about how Martha communicated these preferences or his excessive stress at work 
could excuse his actions. Maybe Martha’s mother told George incorrectly that her favorite 
flowers were carnations. There are many reasons that could excuse the failure to meet these 
expectations and demonstrate that the actions were not manifestations of  ill-will. 
	 But in the case of  demands, this range of  effective excuses is limited. Because demands 
need to be met in every instance and are requirements which constitute a relationship, the reason 
provided for failing to meet the demand has to reach a high level of  excusing power. In the 
cheating case, there are very few excuses that would actually excuse George from his infidelity to 
Martha. Perhaps unbeknownst to both George and Martha, Martha had an evil twin. If  
Martha’s evil twin seduced George and he was unaware that he was being unfaithful, this might 
excuse the violation of  Martha’s demand. But the kinds of  excuses that demands are responsive 
to are extreme situations, ones that are unlikely to come up in everyday, interpersonal 
relationships. This makes the set of  excuses to which demands are sensitive very narrow. 
§ 4.4 FITTINGNESS THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 
	 The last difference I will point out between expectations and demands is when the 
reactive attitudes are a fitting response to an action. Implicit in making a demand is the idea that 
the demander has some authority to make and hold the agent accountable for the demand. 
Almost by definition, what it is to make a demand of  someone is to hold her accountable and to 
sanction her if  she fails to perform the demanded action. This, in conjunction with the frequency 
at which demands need to be fulfilled and the limited range of  excuses to which they are sensitive 
shows that whenever an action seems to violate a demand the reactive attitudes will almost always 
be a fitting response. It is true that if  an agent was able to provide an excuse for an apparent 
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violation of  a demand that the reactive attitudes would not be a fitting response. However 
because of  the limited range of  eligible excuses, this is a very unlikely and irregular occurrence. 
	 While it is almost universally the case that if  a demand appears to be violated, the 
reactive attitudes would be a fitting response, the more nebulous nature of  expectations 
complicates the fittingness of  the reactive attitudes for violations of  expectations. Because 
expectations can have a temporally extended condition of  fulfillment and are sensitive to a wider 
range of  excuses, there are more instances where the reactive attitudes may be an unfitting 
response. In order for the reactive attitudes to be a fitting response, the expectation overall must 
be violated. If  an action would provide a single instance of  when an expectation was not met but 
there is not sufficient data to assess whether an expectation is met overall, the reactive attitudes 
may be intelligible but they would not be fitting. The reactive attitudes will be fitting only when 
we can assess that the overall expectation was violated.  48
	 Additionally, in a manner similar to demands, if  a viable excuse is provided for an action 
that was initially thought to violate an expectation, the reactive attitudes would be unfitting. 
Unlike demands, because expectations have a large range of  excuses they are sensitive to, 
instances where the reactive attitudes are not fitting will be fairly common. Even if  an excuse is 
not explicitly provided, it is possible for the person who is holding the agent responsible to 
manufacture one. Because expectations are susceptible to more excuses, it will be much easier to 
concoct a plausible excuse for a perceived violation of  expectation rather than a perceived 
violation of  a demand.  49
 This may delay when it is acceptable to assess whether an expectation is met or not and may require more 48
discretion because of  its ambiguous nature.
 I am of  the opinion that we should try to interpret actions in a charitable manner, where someone who has been 49
apparently slighted assumes there is a good excuse, just not one to which she is privy. Overall, it seems that to assume 
positive intent of  others is something we ought to do.
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	 Nonetheless, there comes a point with repeated behavior where the reactive attitudes 
seem to be unequivocally called for, even if  there is a temporally extended condition of  
fulfillment. If  Martha insisted that resentment was not a fitting response after ten years of  George 
ignoring her hints, even if  he had excuses for some of  those years, we would question whether or 
not she is actually holding George to that expectation.  
	 Having pulled expectations apart from demands and explicated a few distinguishing 
features including violations of  expectations as morally bad actions, the next two sections aim to 
demonstrate why the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response to a morally bad action and how 
this fits into a larger account of  responsibility. 
§ 5 EXPECTATIONS AND NORMATIVE CLAIMS 
	 In §4 I argued for a significant distinction between expectations and demands that is lost 
when the two terms are treated interchangeably. The synonymous use of  expectations and 
demands fails to recognize that we can expect behaviors of  an agent that we do not require of  
her. Wallace’s use of  expectations and demands as equivalent ways to express strict prohibitions 
or requirements fails to acknowledge the conceptual differences between the two. When Wallace 
does note the distinction between relationship-based and relationship-constituting standards in 
“Dispassionate Opprobrium,” he argues that the normative significance of  moral obligations 
cannot be based in relationships, since relationship-based standards are conditional on the 
existence of  the relationship.  However, he does allow for moral requirements to be relationship 50
constituting:  
 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 364. I agree with Wallace that obligations and therefore demands, as I 50
have construed them, cannot be based in relationships. However, I disagree with Wallace’s definition of  obligation as 
an expectation or a demand that admits moral content. After drawing the distinction I have, I would argue that 
obligations are appropriately construed as strict prohibitions or requirements so that obligations should be 
understood in only terms of  demands which admit moral content, not expectations.
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moral requirements help to realize valuable forms of  interpersonal relation: they are 
relationship constituting… even if  they are not relationship-based. They are also 
directional requirements, specifying forms of  conduct that are owed specifically to other 
individuals (whom we wrong when we fail to comply with the requirements.)   51
Here, Wallace maintains the connection between relationship-constituting standards, 
requirements, and wrongdoing when those requirements are not met. On Wallace’s view, because 
relationship-based standards are conditional and often dependent on reciprocity, they are not 
grounded in the values at the heart of  morality.  Relationship-based standards, and therefore 52
expectations, as I have argued for them, cannot appropriately call for the reactive attitudes on 
Wallace’s account. Shoemaker comes to a similar conclusion in his paper. In his version of  the 
anniversary case, Martha does not experience resentment nor are George’s actions such that he 
can appropriately be held accountable precisely because his behavior does not violate a 
relationship-constituting demand.  On both Wallace and Shoemaker’s accounts, the reactive 53
attitudes and blame cannot be a fitting response when an expectation is not met.  54
	 While I agree with Wallace that demands and obligations cannot be based in a special 
relationship and are instead relationship-constituting, I depart from his view by arguing that 
violations of  relationship-based expectations can call for the reactive attitudes or blame as a 
fitting response. The library example and the modified anniversary example are two cases where 
resentment and blame are fitting responses to actions that do not violate a strict requirement or 
prohibition; in both examples an agent is being held to a normative expectation, rather than a 
 ibid., 366. His emphasis.51
 ibid., 368.52
 Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability,” 624.53
 Here blame is to be understood as accountability blame, blame that is necessarily caught up with the reactive 54
attitudes. Shoemaker writes that Martha’s response of  disappointment and modified attitudes falls under the general 
rubric of  blame, although in a weaker, Scanlonian sense. I made this comment in §3 Two Examples, however I think 
it bears repeating: this weaker sense of  blame is a misnomer — it lacks the necessary quality of  censure or 
opprobrium that is required for blame to be blame.
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demand. Even though expectations are not strict requirements, they still prescribe actions that 
ought to be done. When you hold someone to an expectation you still make a claim on her.   55
	 Claims have a particular kind of  normative force that when violated, a claim calls for the 
actions to be personally justified to whomever made the claim. Making a claim on an agent puts 
you in a distinctly second-personal space such that if  a claim is violated, you have special 
standing to ask her why she acted in such a way.  
	 The notion of  a second-personal stance and the reactive attitudes as moral address have 
been popularized by Stephen Darwall. On Darwall’s account, the reactive attitudes as moral 
address respond not to an agent just as a wrongdoer but also call on the agent to recognize that 
there is a distinctly second-personal reason to have complied with the demand her actions 
violated.  However, like Wallace, Darwall conceives of  the reactive attitudes as tied to demands 56
and obligations. In her attack on Darwall’s account, Mason raises the same objection I do against 
Wallace: the reactive attitudes are appropriate in response to actions that do not violate demands. 
She writes that our proneness to the reactive attitudes 
partly constitutes our valuing the other as an accountable party to the relationship, a 
partner who in reciprocally valuing us both recognizes the normative expectations 
constitutive of  the specific relationship and a more general ideal of  mutual answerability 
for succeeding or failing to comply with legitimate normative expectations.  57
 I intend claims to be taken as weaker than a demand or strict requirement but stronger than a simple request. I 55
also conceive of  claims as necessarily having an interpersonal component to them.
 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, (Cambridge: Harvard University 56
Press, 2006), 145.
 Mason, “Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address,” 166. Mason takes the broad view of  the reactive 57
attitudes as Strawson initially laid out, which include shame, gratitude, forgiveness, etc. My account departs from 
Mason's in this way. Further, because she includes emotions that are directed at an agent’s character she conceives of  
the reactive attitudes having an aretaic nature. This also means that the reactive attitudes play a central role in 
responsibility as attributability. Because I agree with Wallace’s conception of  what it is for a sentiment to be an 
attitude as well as reactive, I disagree that shame and forgiveness ought to be included in the reactive attitudes  and 
believe that the reactive attitudes are appropriately understood as being restricted to the realm of  accountability, so 
long as accountability is not exclusively understood in deontic terms. 
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It is important to note that normative expectations are constitutive of  a good or flourishing 
relationship, rather than the relationship itself, something which I believe Mason is inclined to 
agree with. Regardless, when violated, both demands and normative expectations place us in this 
distinctly second-personal space such that we are justified in pursuing an answer to why the other 
person acted in a way which did not take the claim they were subject to as reason to comply. In 
this second-personal space, when it is clear that the individual does not take the claims that are 
made to them as reason giving, the reactive attitudes will be a fitting response.  
	 I have argued that both expectations and demands make claims; by holding an agent to 
an expectation or a demand, you are making a normative claim on her. In doing so you are 
adopting the quasi-evaluative stance, such that if  you believe the claim has been violated, you are 
susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them fitting. It is because expectations 
make claims on an agent that the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response when they are not 
met. This connection to the reactive attitudes also connects expectations and claims to 
responsibility as accountability. 
	 Consider the library example: you are not demanding that your roommate return your 
books for you. Nonetheless, by holding her to the expectation that she will, you make a claim on 
her and enter into a second-personal space such that when your roommate refuses, you can 
appropriately ask why she refused to do this small favor for you. If  she is unable to provide a good 
excuse, the reactive attitudes would be a fitting response because she violated a claim. The same 
actions that failed to meet your expectations also violated the claim you made on her, making the 
reactive attitudes a fitting response. 
	 Similarly, Martha is not demanding that George pick up on the hints that she drops. 
However, by expecting this behavior, she is making a claim on him. Although George is not 
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required to pick up on Martha’s hints, when he continually fails to do so, he fails to meet her 
overall expectation and therefore violates a claim she made on him. This violation of  a claim 
makes the reactive attitudes a fitting response.  
	 In both the library and anniversary case, although the actions did not violate any strict 
prohibitions or requirements, the actions are considered morally bad, rather than morally wrong. 
However, your roommate and George still violated claims that were made of  them and it is this 
violation that calls for the fittingness of  the reactive attitudes. 
	 The ability of  expectations to make normative claims keeps them from falling into a 
purely aretaic realm. It is not the case that when expectations are not met, the agent is only open 
to a purely aretaic evaluation or is only responsible in the attributability sense. In holding 
someone to an expectation you are making a claim on her, such that when the claim is not met, 
the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response. Given the reactive attitudes’ central role to 
responsibility as accountability, the fittingness of  the reactive attitudes in response to the violation 
of  an expectation also indicates that agents can be blamed and held accountable for actions that 
are morally bad. 
	 The unifying feature between expectations and demands is such that when you hold 
someone to either, both expectations and demands make a claim on the other person and call for 
the same kind of  response. Both expectations and demands call for the agent to personally justify 
her actions such that if  a satisfactory justification cannot be provided, the reactive attitudes can 
be warranted. However, because expectations can be met overall even if  the action that is 
prescribed is not performed in every instance, failing to perform an action that is prescribed by 
an expectation does not always call for the reactive attitudes as a fitting response because it does 
not always violate the claim that is made. It is only when bad actions meet a certain frequency 
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threshold or that it is clear the expectation will not be met the the claim is violated and the 
reactive attitudes can be a fitting response. 
§ 6 A WIDER CONCEPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY  
	 Wallace has laid what I see as an elegant framework for responsibility as accountability. 
His work provides a unified account that explains how and why the reactive attitudes, blame, and 
sanctions are essentially connected to accountability. However, because Wallace construes 
expectations and demands as synonymous ways of  expressing strict prohibitions or requirements, 
his account of  moral responsibility only allows for resentment and blame as fitting responses to 
morally wrong actions.  
	 I have argued that blame and the reactive attitudes can be fitting responses to actions that 
fall outside of  the deontic realm — actions which are more appropriately categorized as morally 
bad rather than morally wrong. As it stands, Wallace’s account of  responsibility precludes this 
possibility. 
	 However, if  the distinction between expectations and demands that I argue for is 
acknowledged, the structure provided by Wallace can account for the full range of  our 
responsibility practices. Holding someone accountable still is to adopt the quasi-evaluative stance, 
which remains unchanged: if  you believe an expectation or a demand is violated, you are 
susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them a fitting response. However, 
because expectations and demands refer to separate standards, leaving the quasi-evaluative stance 
unchanged allows for the reactive attitudes to be a fitting response to both actions that are 
morally wrong and actions that are morally bad.  
	 This account of  responsibility as accountability still explains the propositional content 
and the backwards looking nature of  blame and the reactive attitudes, as Wallace’s original 
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account does, however this account also better fits with our phenomenological experience of  the 
reactive attitudes and recognizes the nuance within our blaming practices. While it is true that 
demands and requirements do play a significant role in accountability and blame, solely relying 
on strict requirements and prohibitions does not give a complete picture of  responsibility. The 
account that I have put forth allows for demands to play their role but also provides a wider and 
unified conception of  accountability that encompasses more of  our practices within responsibility 
and blame. 
	 Wallace writes that “the tendency to blame can be seen to be a peculiarly appropriate way 
of  taking to heart the values around which morality is structured.”  It just so happens that the 58
values at the heart of  morality include more than the concepts of  moral obligation, right, and 
wrong.  
 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 369.58
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